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Abstract
We examine how a remedial education programme for primary school-age children
affects parental expectations about their children’s future. Using original survey data
we collected in Serbia, we investigate whether expectations on labour market pro-
spects and educational attainment change as a consequence of exposure to the Roma
Teaching Assistant programme. Our results show that parents of pupils in treated
schools expect higher returns to education for their children and are more likely to
expect them to achieve a secondary level of education. We also investigate the possi-
ble mechanisms in place due to the characteristics of the programme: remedial edu-
cation and role model.
Received: November 8, 2016; Acceptance: July 2, 2017
1 We would like to thank Tito Boeri, Eliana La Ferrara, Andreas Madestam and Michele Pellizzari for continu-
ous encouragement and very helpful discussions throughout this project. We also thank Orazio Attanasio,
Selim Gulesci, I~nigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, William Pariente, Imran Rasul, Diego Ubfal, Anna Sanz-de-Galdeano
and participants at Student Work in Progress Seminars at UCL, Bocconi University PhD seminar. We thank
Ivie (working papers AD) and the anonymous referee for their comments and suggestions that helped
improve the paper. We are especially indebted to the personnel of the Ipssos Strategic Marketing Agency for
the successful data collection. This study would not have been possible without the support of the Serbian
Ministry of Education. Financial support from the Spanish MEC (Ref. ECO2014-58434-P) and the Serbian Min-
istry of Education, Science and Technological Development (project number: OI 179015) is gratefully acknowl-
edged. All opinions expressed those are of the authors, all errors are our own.
Economics of Transition
Volume 25(4) 2017, 681–721
DOI: 10.1111/ecot.12134
 2017 The Authors
Economics of Transition  2017 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main St, Malden, MA 02148, USA
JEL classiﬁcations: I25, J13, D04.
Keywords: Expectations, perceived returns to education, programme evaluation.
1. Introduction
Expectations for the future consistently affect choices made in the present. The social
environment where one lives plays a role in shaping expectations. The aim of this
paper is to examine the impact on parental expectations of a remedial education
programme for primary school-age children targeting the marginalized Roma
minority group. We study expectations on returns to education and educational
achievement as they affect future-oriented behaviours and we are interested in
investment in education. Roma people usually attain very low education: primary
school attendance rates are in the range of 40 to 60 percent in most countries
(Brueggemann, 2012). Their upper secondary school completion rates are even
lower: only 1 percent of Roma adults aged 25–64 in Portugal, where the rate is low-
est, to 23 percent in Poland, where the rate is highest, have completed compulsory
upper secondary education. There is a clear low investment in education among
them, which can be due to ﬁnancial constraints and the existence of barriers of
access to education.2 However, it is reasonable to assume that Roma people do not
invest in education because they may not expect schooling to give them enough
future opportunities. They might perceive that they face a ‘job ceiling’. In the formal
job market, there is often discrimination against minority groups and they might
not ﬁnd a job even with a high educational level attained. Conversely, the informal
job market – where they mainly work – does not often require any level of educa-
tion: Roma people are primarily involved in casual and seasonal jobs, performed
without a written contract (see Section 2.1). The cost of investing in education
would be perceived as too high compared to the discounted stream of expected
future beneﬁts. Therefore, there is no incentive to invest. If we believe that educa-
tional and career expectations are important factors determining one’s future educa-
tional attainment, then a policy intervention targeting a minority and being able to
change expectations can trigger higher educational attainment.
We ﬁrst investigate whether expectations on labour market prospects and educa-
tional attainment change as a consequence of exposure to the Roma Teaching Assis-
tant programme (RTA). This is a remedial education programme introduced in Serbia
in 2009 and it consists of assigning to each school one Roma Teaching Assistant who
works with Roma children. We focus on parental expectations because we argue that
at such a young age (6–15 years) parents’ beliefs are more relevant for a child’s
2 Roma people often lack the required ID and face ﬁnancial constraints. On average, costs associated with
schooling (books and other school material) in Serbia correspond to almost 2 percent of yearly household
income (LSMS, 2003). In our sample of Roma people, these costs correspond to almost 6 percent of yearly
household income. Moreover, some children face difﬁculties at school due to language barriers. In the Multi-
ple Indicator Cluster Survey conducted by UNICEF in 2006, only 10 percent of Roma declared Serbian to be
their mother tongue.
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educational attainment and more reliable for expected returns to education than a
child’s expectations. Next, we investigate the potential channels for these effects:
remedial education and the role model mechanism. Parents have higher expecta-
tions for their children because they perform better now thanks to the Roma Teach-
ing Assistant. Moreover, in the RTA programme, all the assistants are Roma and
from the same social background as the pupils they help. In order to be assistants,
they needed to invest in education. Their successful experience can be shared with
students and their parents who will be motivated to believe that their children can
achieve analogous results, thanks to the investment in education. We ﬁnd that
parents whose children participate in the programme expect higher returns to
education for their kids. They are also more likely to expect them to achieve a
secondary level of education.
For the purpose of our analysis, we have conducted an extensive survey with
300 Roma households in the capital of Serbia, Belgrade. In Fall 2010, we interviewed
both parents and their children attending 9 schools in 13 different settlements of the
city. The pupils interviewed were randomly selected among students attending the
schools involved in the programme. The RTA programme began in 2009 and we
look at its impact a year after its implementation. The programme was introduced
gradually: some schools received their teaching assistant before others. Parents and
children who attend schools with the teaching assistant in Fall 2009 are our treated
group. Parents and children who attend schools that received the teaching assistant
at a later point in time (Fall 2010) are our control group. The allocation of Roma
teaching assistants was not designed as a randomized experiment: the programme
was designed in such a way that schools and assistants had to apply to be part of it.
Nonetheless, the phasing in of the programme and its selection characteristics miti-
gate concerns regarding the endogeneity of the selection process. Moreover, the pre-
liminary analysis suggests that before the introduction of the programme, the
schools with treated and control children were similar in terms of observable charac-
teristics that could affect expectations. We also explore a second deﬁnition of treat-
ment because there is only one assistant per school and not every Roma child in the
treated school is helped by the assistant. A household is treated here if at least one
child is in a treated school and there is evidence from the survey that the assistant
has worked with the child. The assistant chooses the pupils to work with: they are
not a randomly selected subset of kids in treated schools. Therefore, being in a trea-
ted school only captures the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect and can be used as in a
instrumental variable for being helped by the assistant. The local average treatment
effect (LATE) we estimate is the effect of treatment on the treated. In order to check
the robustness of our results we also employ a propensity score matching method.
The analysis and results are reported in Section B.3. of the online Appendix.
Knowing who is actually helped by the assistant also allows us to better investi-
gate the possible mechanisms leading to the changes in perceived returns we
observe: the remedial education channel and the role model mechanism. Parents are
likely to expect their children to go to school more because they now perform better
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thanks to the assistant. Remedial education is effective. However, once we select the
students performing badly among both the treated and control schools, we still ﬁnd
higher expected returns to education for pupils helped by the assistant compared to
those not helped. The presence of a person from the same social background sharing
a successful story may affect parents’ expectations about their children’s future.
However, the lack of variation in whether the assistant in the RTA programme is
Roma or not makes it more difﬁcult to draw strong conclusions in this respect.
Our paper is in line with the contributions on subjective expectations and informa-
tion gap between perceived and actual returns to schooling.3 Standard economic theory
suggests that, in the presence of perfect information, individuals choose their level of
education by equating themarginal beneﬁts of education to its marginal costs. Underin-
vestment in education can be due to credit constraints, high discount rates or low school
quality.4 However, several works emphasized the importance of subjective expecta-
tions (Jensen, 2010; Kaufmann and Attanasio, 2009; Manski, 1993; Nguyen, 2008). The
returns perceived by individuals affect schooling decisions. Yet, perceptions may be
inaccurate, due to limited or imperfect information. The paper is also related to the liter-
ature on role models for minorities or disadvantaged people. In the nineties, a series of
researchers and policymakers advocated for an increased hiring of minority teachers in
the United States (Graham, 1987; Ladson-Billings, 1994), where the Black–White mark
gap has been intensively investigated. In fact, the relevance of having a teacher with the
same background has been found to be signiﬁcant in improving the achievement gap
for minorities (Dee, 2004). Our paper, together with its companion paper (Battaglia and
Lebedinski, 2015), adds evidence on the short-term effects of remedial education pro-
grammes targeting minority groups. It provides replicable examples in contexts where
minorities suffer low attainment rates and social exclusion, suggesting the role of tar-
geted programmes can be instrumental in increasing their educational attainment. For
Roma people, for instance, this is the case in many other European countries and so far
there are few attempts to investigate how to improve their life circumstances, in gen-
eral, and of children, in particular. Furthermore, we contribute to the existing literature
by providing primary data in a context where data are scarce.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides information on
the institutional setting and the Roma Teaching Assistant programme. The charac-
teristics of the programme are crucial to understand the possible mechanisms at
play. Section 3 describes the way the survey was designed and the data collected in
order to carry out our analysis and it provides some descriptive statistics. Section 4
presents the estimation strategy and results. Section 5 discusses our ﬁndings and
suggests possible general implications of the current research.
3 The literature suggests that this gap can also be ﬁlled by providing additional information through statistics
(Brueggemann, 2012). These tools turn out to be mostly cost–effective solutions rather than incentives, like
cash transfers or private school vouchers.
4 See Glewwe and Kremer (2006) for an extensive summary on education in developing countries.
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2. Institutional setting and the Roma Teaching Assistant
programme
2.1 Education and the labour market
There are many reasons to believe that Roma people may underestimate the need
to invest in education. (For an extensive overview of the situtation of Roma see
online Appendix section B.1.) First, a large percentage of Roma live in segregated
settlements. Since they are isolated from the mainstream society, they do not often
have different models to which they can relate in their immediate neighbourhood
(Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Wilson, 1987). This is conﬁrmed by the 2002 Census
data; 83 percent of people who declared to be Roma live in census tracts where at
least 7 percent of the entire population is Roma (vs. a country average of 1.44 per-
cent). Second, it is extremely rare that Roma people perform jobs for which high
levels of education are required. In Serbia, for instance, there are usually no teach-
ers of Roma origin working in schools and it is rare to ﬁnd them working in public
ofﬁces.5 Third, there is evidence that the mean earnings of Roma workers are lower
than those of non-Roma workers, especially for higher levels of education. Figure 1
reports average wages for the city of Belgrade for Roma and non-Roma. Data for
Roma and non-Roma come from different sources: the Serbian Statistical Ofﬁce
provides earnings statistics for the whole population and does not distinguish
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Figure 1. Comparison of wages by level of education (in dinars) for
Roma and non-Roma (Belgrade)
5 In our sample only 7 percent of women and 6 percent of men of working age perform jobs under a full-time
contract in the formal sector and none of them in the public sector.
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between different ethnic groups. These data are collected for jobs in the formal
sector that are not usually performed by Roma people and correspond in the ﬁgure
to those of the non-Roma group. Data for Roma are calculated from our sample.6
This ﬁgure intends to simply provide a picture of the context and does not attempt
to be indicative of the exact amounts. The gap in real wages between the two
groups is unambiguous for every level of education and each gender.
Nonetheless, even if there is evidence of a gap between Roma and non-Roma,
among Roma themselves, there are large differences in average earnings across differ-
ent educational levels. In our sample, for instance, average wages with secondary edu-
cation are 27 percent higher than with primary education for men and 21 percent for
women, and average wages with primary education are 29 percent higher than with
uncompleted primary for men and 21 percent for women.7 Moreover, the higher the
educational level attained, the better are the job market prospects, both in terms of
type of contract and place where the job is performed. The data from the Living Stan-
dards Measurement Study (LSMS, 2003) reported in Figure 2 suggest that these differ-
ences are substantial for Roma living in Serbia. The top panel presents their types of
contract by the educational level. As can be seen, 90 percent of men and 80 percent of
women with a secondary education level have got a written contract, while almost
none works without a contract. Conversely, among those with only primary school-
ing, almost 30 percent do not have a contract. The bottom panel reports the places
where jobs are performed. The percentage of those who work in the street or in ﬂea
markets reduces drastically with the level of education. This is even more evident for
women. The opposite pattern is observed when the workplace is an ofﬁce or factory.
Therefore, conditional on the fact that Roma people’s earnings are lower than those
of non-Roma, there is still room for improvement based on education among Roma.
The more one studies, the higher the potential wages and the better the potential job
conditions. However, it is crucial to understand whether parents are aware of the
actual returns to schooling. If Roma people underestimate the outcomes of investing
in education, a policy intervention can be successful in increasing their expectations.
Because we could not conduct a baseline survey before the programme was imple-
mented, we need to look at data of parents not affected by the programme, assuming
they are a comparable group to those affected. Figure 3 reports the distributions of
expected returns to education for parents whose children attend the schools that
received the assistant in the second year of the RTA. Their averages are shown in solid
lines. The dashed lines correspond to average wages of people in our sample by edu-
cation. There are few women who completed primary schooling and especially sec-
ondary school. Thus, the results for girls are less informative. Ofﬁcial data do not
provide this information.
6 There are no ofﬁcial data on earnings coming from informal activities, which are mainly performed by
Roma people.
7 For non-Roma the average wages with secondary education are 49 percent higher than with primary educa-
tion for boys and 60 percent for girls. For non-Roma, we use 2011 data for the city of Belgrade obtained from
the Serbian Statistical Ofﬁce (2010).
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The ﬁrst panel reports the expected wage distributions, conditional on not hav-
ing attained any level of education. These distributions are more concentrated to the
right of the dashed lines of actual average returns, indicating that parents expect
higher returns for their children when no level of education is attained. The second
and third panels of the ﬁgure report the expected wage distributions, conditional on
having a primary and a secondary level of education, respectively. For boys, these
distributions tend to be more concentrated to the left of the dashed line of actual
average returns. Thus, parents expect for their sons less than what people with these
education levels actually earn. There is limited or imperfect information, and this
likely fosters low expectations for Roma people.
2.2 The Roma Teaching Assistant programme
The Roma Teaching Assistant programme is the main programme in Central and
Eastern Europe aimed at improving inclusion of Roma in education.8 After the
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Figure 2. Job characteristics by education levels – Roma people (LSMS, 2003) [Col-
our ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
8 For a more extensive description of the programme see Battaglia and Lebedinski (2015).
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initial pilot phase, the programme attained a wider coverage in the 2009/2010
school year.9 In Fall 2009, 26 primary schools (Early Enrollees) enrolled in the RTA
programme. In the following year an additional 77 primary schools (Late Enrollees)
joined. Each school receives one teaching assistant. On average, the number of Roma
per school is 75 (20 percent of total pupils enrolled) and assistants work with one
third of them, especially in the lower grades. Although schools are free to allocate
the assistants’ schedule, their major tasks are helping children during regular classes
and organizing extra, after-school classes. One day per week the assistant visits the
parents of children who are not attending school and informs other parents about
their children’s progress.
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The vertical dashed ( solid ) lines mark the estimated ( expected ) average returns in dinars.
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Figure 3. Comparison of real and expected returns to education (our sample) [Col-
our ﬁgure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
9 The Roma Teaching Assistant programme started out as a pilot programme implemented by various NGOs
in 2002. A total of 22 schools received an assistant at different points of time from 2002 to 2007. These are not
the same schools that had an assistant from 2009 onwards and are excluded from our analysis. In 2007 the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) took over the coordination and ﬁnancing of the
programme. Beginning in 2009, the RTA programme had a country coverage and is now coordinated by the
Ministry of Education.
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The RTA programme was not designed by the Ministry of Education as a ran-
domized experiment: schools and assistants had to apply in order to be part of it.
Yet, the phasing in of the programme and its selection characteristics mitigate con-
cerns regarding the endogeneity of the selection process. Schools were selected
based on the following two criteria: (1) a percentage of Roma pupils between 5 per-
cent and 40 percent, and (2) preferably the availability of a preschool programme in
the school.10 The requirements for assistants are as follows: (1) secondary school
attainment, (2) knowledge of Romani, and (3) preferably experience working with
children.11 It is not explicitly stated that the assistant needs to be Roma: only the
knowledge of their language is required. However, all of them are of Roma origin.
All the assistants live in the same municipality as the school for which they work.
Ideally we would have liked to randomly allocate the schools in the two years and
the assistants among schools. Since we could not intervene in the phase of imple-
mentation of the programme but only in its evaluation, what we can show is that
the phasing in of the programme can be treated as if it were exogenous for the fol-
lowing reasons. First, the selection criteria remained the same in both years and
schools and assistants which applied for the RTA programme in the ﬁrst year and
did not get selected could also apply in the second year.12 Second, schools applying
before and after do not differ in terms of the only observable characteristic available
to the selection committee: in Belgrade, the percentage of Roma pupils was 14.37
percent in schools that applied for the programme in 2009 and 12.38 percent in the
schools that applied in 2010. The difference is not statistically signiﬁcant
(P = 0.5791).13 Third, the schools selected in the ﬁrst year do not differ from the
10 Information on the existence of a preschool programme are available only for the 78 schools that applied
for the RTA programme in 2009. For the 252 schools applying in 2010 this information was no longer required.
In that year, 50 assistants were assigned to kindergartens offering preschool programmes. Schools which were
not offering the a programme could have then been close to kindergartens offering one and the Roma pupil
would have been helped by an assistant from her entry in the school anyhow. Since 2007, it is compulsory to
attend a free preschool programme for at least six months. In 2010, this requirement was extended to nine
months. One could argue that this small change in requirements could lead to a selection bias in the two
rounds, but some schools without the compulsory programme were also selected in the previous year because
it was not a binding requirement and some schools with the preschool programme were selected in the second
year. Thus, our data mitigate this concern.
11 Of the 158 candidates that applied in 2009, 26 were selected. In 2010, of the 329 applicants, 77 got the job
(and 50 more became assistants in kindergartens). Among the candidates belonging to the same municipality
of the school selected, detailed criteria based on level of education attained, motivation and experience of
working with children, were used to evaluate assistants. Thus, ﬁrst the school is selected, then the assistant.
12 In Belgrade, the assistants who applied in the ﬁrst round and did not get selected were not selected in the
second round either. Thus, concerns that more qualiﬁed assistants are selected ﬁrst and the worst in the sec-
ond round are mitigated in our data.
13 In all Serbia the percentage of Roma pupils is 13.99 percent in schools which applied in 2009 and 13.08 per-
cent in schools which applied in 2010. The difference is not statistically signiﬁcant (P = 0.4581). For schools
that applied and did not get selected, this is the only information available, together with their size. In Bel-
grade, the schools applying in 2009 had, on average, 780 pupils, while those applying in 2010 had 657 pupils.
The difference is not statistically signiﬁcant (P = 0.5226).
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schools that were selected later in terms of their observable characteristics. The same
holds for the assistants. Table 1 reports the school characteristics for the schools in
our sample before implementing the RTA programme.
We collected data from nine schools in Belgrade, ﬁve of which received an assis-
tant in 2009 and four of which received one in 2010.14Early and Late Enrollees schools
are similar in terms of their observable characteristics.15 Before the introduction of
the programme, Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees schools had a similar number of
Roma per class, 4.75 and 5.75, respectively, a comparable class size (20.60 and 22.75
students, respectively) and a similar percentage of Roma per school (23 percent and
24 percent, respectively). The sex composition among Roma is the same: in Early
Enrollees schools 53 percent of students are female and in Late Enrollees schools 47
percent are female. As regards place of birth, 80 percent of Roma in Early Enrollees
schools are born in Belgrade, and 76 percent in Late Enrollees schools. These charac-
teristics are also comparable in the previous year, with no statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference in any of the observable characteristics. The descriptive statistics are
reported in Table A1 of the Appendix. The characteristics of the assistants in the two
types of school are also comparable. Almost all of them are female and have experi-
ence in NGOs. In Early Enrollees schools, 40 percent of the assistants got a university
degree; in Late Enrollees schools 33 percent.16 Furthermore, school quality is not dif-
ferent between Early and Late Enrollees schools. Average marks, absences and drop-
out rates of previous years in Early Enrollees schools do not suggest they are better
schools (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2015).17
One concern is that motivation may differ between schools applying before and
schools applying later.18 If these motivations are related to differences in principle
or school quality it might cause a selection bias problem. Our estimates can be over-
estimated: parents’ expectations can be correlated with the quality of the school. If
children are going to better schools, parents may reasonably expect better educa-
tional attainment and better labour market prospects for them, unconditional to the
14 Six schools in Belgrade were selected to participate in the RTA programme in the ﬁrst year of its implemen-
tation. One school did not provide us the list of students so it is excluded from our sample. Nine schools were
selected in 2010. We obtained the list of students and detailed administrative data from a subsample of four
schools. For the remaining ﬁve schools we only know the percentage of Roma per school. Their percentages
are comparable to those in our subsample.
15 The same holds for the whole sample of schools involved in the programme in Serbia. In the RTA pro-
gramme, the schools selected in the ﬁrst year are not different from the schools selected later in terms of their
observable characteristics. The same holds for the assistants (Battaglia and Lebedinski, 2015).
16 Among assistants in Late Enrollees schools there is one missing value for the information on the maximum
level of education. This explains why the categories secondary school and university do not sum to 1.
17 Table A2 of the Appendix reports the marks, absences and dropout rates of pupils in both Early and Late
Enrollees schools in Belgrade for the year of the introduction of the programme and the previous year.
18 In both years, the programme was advertised in the Politika and Prosvetni Pregled newspapers. The latter
newspaper is for people working in the education sector. In 2010/2011 schools’ directorates – one directorate
may be responsible for more than a municipality – were in charge of sending applications directly to the
schools.
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programme. However, this concern can be mitigated since school quality is not dif-
ferent between Early Enrollees and Late Enrollees. Moreover, principal quality should
be reﬂected in assistant quality in order to affect parents’ expectations but the assis-
tants are not chosen by the principal.
Therefore, we know ﬁrst that selection criteria remained the same in both years
and the selection committee rated schools in the same way. Second, schools could
Table 1. Characteristics of the schools and assistants (Belgrade) before the introduc-
tion of the RTA programme 2009
All Early
Enrollees
Late
Enrollees
Difference
(1  2)
P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristics of the schools
Class size 21.55 20.60 22.75 2.15 [0.505]
No. of Roma per class 4.67 3.80 5.75 1.95 [0.566]
No. of Roma per class
(if at least one Roma)
5.25 4.75 5.75 1.00 [0.764]
No. of Roma per school (%) 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.01 [0.952]
Female
Roma 0.49 0.53 0.47 0.06 [0.209]
Non-Roma 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.01 [0.544]
Born in the same town
Roma 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.04 [0.358]
Non-Roma 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.00 [0.722]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
Number of Roma pupils 581 231 350
Number of Non-Roma pupils 2,133 927 1,206
Characteristics of the assistants
Female 0.875 0.8 1 0.2 [0.374]
Maximum level of education
Secondary school 0.5 0.6 0.33 0.27 [0.543]
University 0.375 0.4 0.33 0.07 [0.877]
Experience with Roma 0.75 1 0.33 0.67 [0.183]
Experience in NGO 1 1 1 0 [.]
Number of assistants 8 5 3b
Notes:aEarly Enrollees schools are 6. One school did not provide us the list of students so it is excluded from
our sample.
b We could not get information about one assistant in Late Enrollees schools.
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apply in both years and those applying before and after do not differ in terms of
observable characteristics. Third, the schools selected in both years do not differ in
terms of observable characteristics. Fourth, the quality of the schools selected in both
years is not different. Based on these facts, we argue that the phasing in of the pro-
gramme can be treated as if it were exogenous.
3. Data and descriptive statistics
We use ﬁrst-hand collected data obtained through a survey conducted with 300
Roma households in ﬁve municipalities of Belgrade.19 The survey took place in Fall
2010, one year after the implementation of the programme in Early Enrollees and
before Late Enrollees schools received the assistant. In 2010 schools received the assis-
tant in November/December.
The households in our sample have children who were enrolled in both types of
primary school. The pupils interviewed were randomly selected among the students
attending the schools.20 We know that assistants work mainly with pupils in the
lower four grades and we are interested in the effect of the RTA programme on this
subgroup of children.21 Our sample is constructed in such a way that all households
have at least one child in the lower four grades of primary school in the school year
2009/2010.22
Figure 4 displays a map of Belgrade with the 13 neighbourhoods located in the
ﬁve municipalities where the survey was conducted. In settlements 1 to 5, the assis-
tants began to work in 2009/2010 and they correspond to the settlements with chil-
dren from Early Enrollees schools. Settlements 6 to 13 had assistants starting from
2010/2011 (Late Enrollees). As shown, Early and Late Enrollees are located in different
neighbourhoods of Belgrade, so concerns regarding potential spillovers across
schools are not relevant in our context.23 Potential spillovers between students who
are helped or not by the assistant within Early Enrollees schools cannot be excluded.
Parents who live in the same area are also likely to interact.24 Nevertheless, if there
19 The ﬁve municipalities are Vozdovac, Zvezdara, Zemun, Palilula and Cukarica.
20 The response rate was 93.46 percent: 321 households were contacted and 300 answered. Households were
not compensated for their participation.
21 In Serbia, primary school is 8 years in duration. In the ﬁrst four grades pupils get one teacher who teaches
all compulsory subjects except English, while in the upper four years pupils get one teacher per subject. School
is compulsory until the age of 15. Children enroll in primary school if they are aged at least 6.5 years at the
start of the school year in September.
22 Our sample includes households which enrolled their children in 2009/2010. Thus, students who dropout
are included in the sample.
23 Only one suburban area has an Early and a Late Enroollees school, which are located on opposite sides of the
village.
24 In 70 percent of cases the pupils live in different areas of the neighbourhood where the school is located
and among those living on the same street, pupils not helped by the assistant are older and enrolled in higher
grades. They might be less likely to interact, both inside and outside the school, with pupils who are helped.
 2017 The Authors
Economics of Transition  2017 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
692 Battaglia and Lebedinski
are spillover effects from children helped by the assistants to children not helped by
them, the impacts we observe would be the lower bounds of the actual impact. We
would be underestimating the effects of the programme.
3.1 First deﬁnition: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
Our sample is divided into two groups. The ﬁrst group consists of 122 households
with children enrolled in the ﬁve schools which received a Roma teaching assistant
Figure 4. Neighbourhoods of the survey [Colour ﬁgure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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in 2009/2010. These households are randomly selected among households with at
least one child in a Early Enrollees school and correspond to the treated group. The
178 remaining households were randomly selected from students attending the four
schools which implemented the RTA programme in 2010/2011 and they are our
control group. The number of households selected from each settlement is propor-
tional to the size of the settlement. We consider the whole household to be treated if
at least one child goes to a school with an assistant in the ﬁrst year of the implemen-
tation of the programme.
Table 2 reports the predetermined characteristics of treated and control groups.
The treated and control groups are comparable in terms of observable characteris-
tics. Their differences in means are not statistically signiﬁcant in almost all cases.
Wealth, monthly income, educational attainments and household composition do
not differ between the groups.25 Households are equally located in rural and urban
areas,26 and in only Roma neighbourhoods.27 A total of 32 percent of households in
the control group and 31 percent in the treated group have at least one member
working in the informal sector. The only statistically signiﬁcant difference is found
in terms of religion: there are signiﬁcantly more Muslims among non-treated house-
holds (80 percent vs. 57 percent). Therefore, it would be worthwhile investigating
whether the programme impacts differently depending on the religion (see section
A.4 of the Appendix on heterogeneous effects).28
Unfortunately, our study has a limited power and we are aware that signiﬁcant
true differences might go undetected due to it.29 However, if we were concerned
that a possible imbalance between the two groups may affect the results, it is unli-
kely that it would lead to their overestimation. The characteristics of the households
whose children are enrolled in the Early Enrollees schools are associated, if any, with
higher labour market prospects and educational attainment. The small, non-signiﬁ-
cant differences go in a direction such that one would expect them to make our esti-
mates lower bounds of the true effects.
25 Birth order among siblings is signiﬁcantly higher among treated households. Nonetheless, we do not
believe this to be problematic given that household composition does not differ between the two groups.
26 We deﬁne urban area as a local community with more than 35,000 inhabitants, in line with the deﬁnition of
the Municipality of the City of Belgrade that distinguishes between urban and suburban areas in its own
territory.
27 We asked households whether there were only Roma or both Roma and non-Roma in their community/
neighbourhood (200 meters around their house). Therefore, the neighbourhoods do not correspond exactly to
the 13 settlements where the survey was conducted.
28 Overall, the characteristics of our sample are in line with ofﬁcial data (LSMS, 2003). Surprisingly, there are
few households where both parents have not completed primary school (7 percent) and in a relatively large
share of households at least one parent has completed secondary school (19 percent). However, this might be
driven simply by the fact that LSMS data are only collected in segregated settlements that are likely to be
poorer.
29 With nine clusters and 75 students per school, the minimum detectable effect in our case is 0.35 of a stan-
dard deviation (Spybrook et al., 2011).
 2017 The Authors
Economics of Transition  2017 The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
694 Battaglia and Lebedinski
Table 2. Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
Means of control variables in treated and control households
All Treatment Control Difference
Variables at the household level
Wealtha 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.36
(0.39)
Monthly total income (in dinars)b 28,949.47 28,224.39 29,453.33 1,228.94
(2,574.97)
Informal (=1)c 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.01
(0.05)
Urban (=1) 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.06
(0.06)
Only Roma in neighbourhood (=1)d 0.21 0.28 0.16 0.12
(0.07)
No schooling/unﬁnished primary school (=1)e 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00
(0.03)
Finished primary school (=1)e 0.74 0.69 0.76 0.07
(0.05)
Finished secondary school (=1)e 0.19 0.23 0.16 0.07
(0.05)
Muslim (=1) 0.71 0.57 0.80 0.23**
(0.10)
Number of children under 5 years 0.72 0.75 0.70 0.05
(0.10)
Number of female children between 6 and 15 years 1.65 1.73 1.59 0.14
(0.13)
Number of male children between 6 and 15 years 1.75 1.80 1.80 0.10
(0.12)
Number of adults 2.44 2.46 2.44 0.02
(0.12)
Max no. observations 300 122 178
Variables at the individual level
Children characteristics
Male (=1) 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.04
(0.04)
Age of child 9.89 10.11 9.74 0.37
(0.28)
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In addition to the comparability between treatment and control group, identiﬁca-
tion requires the absence of selective sorting into treatment. Schools and assistants
were informed in late June 2009 if they had been accepted into the programme. Nei-
ther the Ministry of Education nor the schools disseminated the information about the
RTA programme among the parents. The programme was not publicized on TV or
radio. By the end of June when the Ministry decided who would participate in the
programme, parents whose children were going to enter the ﬁrst grade in September
of that year had already enrolled them in school. Our data also conﬁrm that Early
Enrollees did not attract more Roma students than Late Enrollees in the ﬁrst year of the
programme.30 We can conclude that there is no selection of children into schools.
3.2 Second deﬁnition: Directly helped vs. not directly helped by the
assistant in Early Enrollees schools
Our deﬁnition of treated and control group assumes that everyone in a school with
an assistant is aware of her presence. Roma people usually live in communities
where they know each other and regularly interact. They are even in contact with
people living elsewhere belonging to the same community. Family and community
Table 2. (Continued)
All Treatment Control Difference
Rank among siblings 2.20 2.33 2.11 0.22**
(0.10)
Mark in Mathematicsf 2.77 2.86 2.70 0.16
(0.11)
Mark in Serbianf 2.85 2.94 2.79 0.15
(0.11)
Max no. observations 673 280 393
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1
percent.
aThe wealth index was calculated with principal component analysis. The index ranges between 5.55 and
3.69.
b28,950 dinars corresponds to 279 Euro (1 RSD = 0.009626 Euro, November 2011).
c = 1 if at least one household member works in the informal sector.
d = 1 if the respondent declared that the household lives in an exclusively Roma neighbourhood.
eIt refers to the highest level of education obtained by parents.
fWe use demeaned mark in Mathematics and Serbian. The mark is demeaned from the average school mark.
30 Roma pupils attending Early Enrollees schools in the pre-treatment year – 2008/2009 – corresponded to 2.4
percent of all Roma enrolled in these schools. In Late Enrollees they accounted for 2.1 percent. In 2009/2010
these percentages were 1.6 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively. The number of Roma pupils enrolling in
school for the ﬁrst time reduced from one year to the other but it did it proportionally in both types of schools.
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ties are strong. Moreover, all the assistants live and work in the same municipality.
It is unlikely that households do not know that there is a Roma assistant in the
school their children are enrolled in. However, there is only one assistant per school
and not every Roma child in the treated school is helped by her. One can argue then
that only parents of children directly interacting with the assistant are the actual
treated group. We can therefore explore another deﬁnition of being treated beside
the main one. A household is treated if at least one child is in an Early Enrollee school
and there is evidence from the survey that the assistant has worked with her. The
school cannot keep track of the names of the children with whom the assistant inter-
acts but we obtain this information from the parents. In this case we are certain that
the treated households are aware of the presence of the assistant. A household is
treated if either (1) parents state that there is someone in the school who helps the
child with her homework or she is having additional classes at school, or (2) there is
someone from the school who comes to her place or calls her because of the child. In
these cases we know from the parents the name of the person who is helping their
child and we can match it with the name of the assistant.31
Table 3 reports the characteristics of households with treated and not treated
children in Early Enrollees schools.32
The differences in means between those helped by the assistant (treated) and
those not helped (untreated) are often not statistically signiﬁcant. Nonetheless, chil-
dren helped by the assistant mainly live in urban areas and have at least one family
member working in the informal sector and less educated parents. There are also
more Muslims among them. Moreover, the assistant works mainly with younger
children, as also suggested by the guidelines of the programme.
3.3 Outcome variables
We use three different sets of questions to understand whether the programme is
effective in changing parents’ expectations about their children’s future opportuni-
ties. (See section B.2. of the online Appendix to understand how our variables are
derived from the Likert scale.) We focus on parents’ expectations because we believe
that at such a young age (6–15 years) they are more relevant for children’s educa-
tional attainment and more reliable for expected returns to education than children’s
expectations. However we ask pupils about the highest expected level of education
they expect to achieve (see section B.4. of the online Appendix).
31 We decided not to explicitly ask the parents whether their child’s school was in the RTA programme
because it was not clear to us whether the parents are aware of the name of the programme and how they per-
ceive the teaching assistant, for instance as assistant or teacher.
32 Treated children account for 50 percent of pupils in Early Enrollees schools. This percentage is slightly
higher than has been reported before – assistants work with one-third of Roma students – because in the sur-
vey, we selected households with at least one child in the lower four grades of primary school (not in all eight
grades). The rationale is that we know that assistants work mainly, if not exclusively, with them.
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Table 3. Early Enrollees
Means of control variables for treated and untreated households
Treated Untreated Difference
Variables at the household level
Wealtha 0.38 0.13 0.51
(0.46)
Total income (in dinars)b 27,905 29,052 1,147
(3,270)
Informal (=1)c 0.39 0.25 0.14*
(0.081)
Urban (=1) 0.66 0.29 0.37***
(0.07)
Only Roma in neighbourhood (=1)d 0.35 0.21 0.14
(0.09)
No schooling/unﬁnished primary school (=1)e 0.11 0.03 0.08
(0.06)
Finished primary school (=1)e 0.63 0.75 0.12*
(0.07)
Finished secondary school (=1)e 0.25 0.21 0.03
(0.07)
Muslim (=1) 0.68 0.47 0.21**
(0.09)
Number of children under 5 years 0.87 0.66 0.21
(0.16)
Number of female children between 6 and 18 years 1.82 1.67 0.15
(0.16)
Number of male children between 6 and 18 years 1.86 1.75 0.11
(0.18)
Number of adults 2.53 2.38 0.15
(0.17)
Max no. observations 65 56
Variables at the individual level
Children characteristics
Male (=1) 0.5 0.5 0
(0.05)
Age of child 9.73 10.44 0.69**
(0.31)
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The ﬁrst and second set of questions relates to expected returns to education.
Although either the mother or father (or caretaker) are asked these questions,
the mother is the main interviewee in 92 percent of cases. They are asked about
the oldest boy and the oldest girl in the household.33 The ﬁrst set of questions
considers expectations about the likelihood of getting a job given a certain level
of education attained. The second set of questions elicits minimum and maxi-
mum amounts parents expect that their children will earn once employed. We
obtained the minimum and maximum earnings and we use their (log) average
as our measure of expected earnings. The third relevant outcome is the highest
expected educational level of the child. The question is asked for each child
between 6 and 15 years old, so that all the oldest boys and oldest girls are
included and possibly their younger siblings as well.34,35 Summary statistics for
Table 3. (Continued)
Treated Untreated Difference
Rank among siblings 2.34 2.33 0.01
(0.17)
Mark in Mathematicsf 2.91 2.81 0.10
(0.14)
Mark in Serbianf 3.03 2.87 0.16
(0.14)
Max no. observations 148 130
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1
percent.
aThe wealth index was calculated with principal component analysis. The index ranges between 5.55 and
3.69.
b28,950 dinars corresponds to 279 Euro (1 RSD = 0.009626 Euro, November 2011).
c = 1 if at least one household member works in the informal sector.
d = 1 if the respondent declared that the household lives in an exclusively Roma neighbourhood.
eIt refers to the highest level of education obtained by a household member.
fWe use demeaned mark in Mathematics and Serbian. The mark is demeaned from the average school mark.
33 In the pilot survey, we asked the questions for each child but we realized that there was no variation in the
responses between the children of the same sex. As a result, we decided to ask these questions only with
regard to the oldest male and for the oldest female child. In only 6 percent of cases, the oldest child is older
than 15 and thus not enrolled in a compulsory school. In this case, respondents were asked to respond to these
questions for the second oldest child.
34 The median number of children aged 6–15 per household is 2. There are many missing values for this out-
come of interest. This explains why our sample is as large as with the other outcomes.
35 For the sake of consistency, we also estimate the impact with a reduced sample, corresponding only to the
case that (name) is the oldest boy or the oldest girl in the household. The results are not reported, but they are
discussed in the footnotes.
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the outcome variables in our sample are reported in Table 4 and suggest a pos-
sible positive impact of the programme on both expected salary and level of
education attained.
Table 4. Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
Means of outcome variables in treated and control households
All Treatment Control Difference
Variables at the household level
Probability of ﬁnding a job: Boys
With primary school (=1)a 0.42 0.35 0.48 0.13**
(0.06)
With secondary school (=1)a 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.00
(0.05)
Probability of ﬁnding a job: Girls
With primary school (=1)a 0.35 0.31 0.39 0.08
(0.06)
With secondary school (=1)a 0.79 0.74 0.82 0.07
(0.05)
Max no. observations 296 120 176
Expected mean log earning: Boys
With primary school 9.91b 9.97 9.87 0.10
(0.06)
With secondary school 10.21c 10.24 10.18 0.06*
(0.19)
Expected mean log earning: Girls
With primary school 9.82d 9.90 9.78 0.12*
(0.07)
With secondary school 10.14e 10.18 10.11 0.07*
(0.04)
Max no. observations 241 97 144
Variables at the individual level
Expected to ﬁnish: Boys
Secondary school (=1) 0.61 0.67 0.57 0.10*
(0.06)
Expected to ﬁnish: Girls
Secondary school (=1) 0.63 0.67 0.60 0.07
(0.06)
Max no. observations 299 120 179
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4. Estimation strategy and results
4.1 First deﬁnition: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
We estimate the impacts of the RTA programme on expected returns to education
with the following speciﬁcation:
Yj ¼ a0 þ a1treatmentj þ a2X0j þ ej ð1Þ
where Yj corresponds to the outcomes of interest for the household j: likelihood of
ﬁnding a job with primary school as the highest level of education attained, likeli-
hood of ﬁnding a job with secondary school as the highest level of education
attained, (log) mean amount of earnings per month with primary education and
(log) mean amount of earnings per month with secondary education. treatmentj
equals 1 if there is at least one child in the household who goes to an Early Enrollees
school. X0j includes household wealth per capita, if a member of the family works in
the informal sector, if the household lives in a urban area and in a Roma neighbour-
hood, if the household is Muslim and the maximum educational level of parents
and household composition characteristics. For the outcome ‘secondary school as
the highest expected level of education’, we have information for each child in the
household between 6 and 15 years old. We introduce a second speciﬁcation where
the dependent variable is at the child level:
Yij ¼ b0 þ b1treatmentj þ b2X0ij þ mij ð2Þ
where treatmentj is deﬁned as above. X0ij also includes age and age squared of the
child, the child’s gender, birth order among siblings, and – in order to control for
each child’s ability – demeaned mark in Mathematics and Serbian of the previous
school year.36 Robust standard errors are clustered at the school level and corrected
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1
percent.
aRespondent expects the child to ﬁnd a job given a certain level of education achieved.
bThe corresponding average earning is 21,709 dinars (208 Euro, November 2011). For treated households is
22,985 dinars (221 Euro, November 2011); for control households is 21,075 dinars (202 Euro, November 2011).
cThe corresponding average earning is 28,654 dinars (276 Euro, November 2011). For treated households is
29,398 dinars (283 Euro, November 2011); for control households is 28,141 dinars (271 Euro, November 2011).
dThe corresponding average earning is 19,432 dinars (187 Euro, November 2011). For treated households is
20,915 dinars (201 Euro, November 2011); for control households is 18,682 dinars (180 Euro, November 2011).
eThe corresponding average earning is 26,923 dinars (259 Euro, November 2011). For treated households is
27,529 dinars (265 Euro, November 2011); for control households is 26,527 dinars (255 Euro, November 2011).
Table 4. (Continued)
36 The marks are demeaned from the average school marks (among Roma). For children in their ﬁrst grade,
the average school marks are used.
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with Moulton conﬁdence intervals in case of linear regressions (Imbens and Kolesar,
2016). Regressions are estimated separately for boys and girls because we are inter-
ested in the effects for each gender.37 We also report the results with the pooled sam-
ple in Table A3 of the Appendix.
The results for the probability of ﬁnding a job, expected earnings and highest
expected educational level are reported in Table 5. For purposes of consistency, all
the estimates are OLS, but probit estimates for the two dummy outcomes conﬁrm the
results. We need to bear in mind that the way in which the programme is designed
constrains us to nine clusters – the schools involved in the programme – and 75 pupils
treated per school, who are equally distributed between boys and girls. The intra-
class correlation with our outcomes is equal to 0.05 for the sample of boys and 0.10
for the sample of girls. With a power of 0.8, the minimum detectable effect is 0.5 of a
standard deviation (McConnell and Vera-Hernandez, 2015; Spybrook et al., 2011).
Nonetheless, we obtain statistically signiﬁcant results with the limited power of 0.4.
Columns (1)–(4) show estimates for boys, while columns (5)–(8) refer to girls.
The coefﬁcients for the expected probabilities of ﬁnding a job with primary and sec-
ondary school as the highest level of education are reported in the top panel of
Table 5. The results are not statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations. We retain the
null hypothesis that the population mean of the outcome variable in the treatment
group will be the same as in the control group for the probability of ﬁnding a job.
However, due to the limited power of our study, we may have committed a Type II
error, that is, the probability of ﬁnding no intervention effect when one actually
exists, making these results virtually impossible to interpret. We cannot claim the
programme to be ineffective on job opportunities if there is low power, since low
power means that we have little chance of ﬁnding an effect on the mean of the out-
come variable when there is a true effect.
The middle part of the table shows the results for the expected (log) mean earn-
ings per month. Parents in treated households expect higher future wages for both
boys and girls, although the results are statistically signiﬁcant only at 10 percent.
Conditional on having attained a secondary educational level, being in a treated
household increases the expected monthly earnings by almost 9.4 percent for boys
and 10.07 percent for girls, on average (0.286 and 0.291 of a standard deviation,
respectively).38 This increase corresponds to almost 26 euros (roughly 7 euros more
per week) with respect to an average expected earning in households not involved
in the programme of 271 euros for boys and 255 euros for girls. Thus, although
37 It is worth investigating whether the gender of the assistant may affect boys and girls differently for our
outcomes of interest. The results do not suggest that expectations change depending on the sex of the assis-
tant. This seems to matter only for the likelihood of getting a secondary education level for girls. Their parents
expect them to achieve a higher level of education when the assistant is female than when he is male. How-
ever, the caveat here is that among assistants only one is male.
38 The regression coefﬁcients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities. 0.090 corresponds to 100 9 (e0.090  1);
0.096 corresponds to 100 9 (e0.096  1). We estimate the effects also with minimum and maximum earnings.
The results are similar.
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treated parents may not expect higher employment perspectives for their children,
they do expect higher wages once they obtain a job. This suggests that they expect
them to get better jobs.39 Moreover, being in a treated household increases the
expected monthly earnings by almost 11 percent for boys and 13 percent for girls,
on average, conditional on having attained a primary educational level (0.312 and
0.123 of a standard deviation, respectively).
The regression results for secondary education as the highest expected level of
education are reported in the bottom part of the table. We ﬁnd that parents in trea-
ted households are more likely to expect their children to ﬁnish secondary school.
The impact is statistically signiﬁcant only for boys. On average, parents of pupils in
Early Enrollees schools are 12 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to
ﬁnish secondary school (0.243 of a standard deviation).40
4.2 Second deﬁnition: Directly helped vs. not directly helped by the
assistant in Early Enrollees schools
There is only one assistant per school and not every Roma child in the treated school
is helped by her. One can argue that only parents of children directly interacting
with the assistant can be affected by her presence in the school. Our second deﬁni-
tion considers a household to be treated only if at least one child attends an Early
Enrollees school and the assistant has worked with her.
The assistant chooses the pupils she works with: treated children are not ran-
domly selected. The children receiving the treatment are a selected subset of Early
Enrollees school children. A simple comparison between those actually helped and
the control group (those not helped in Early Enrollees schools and children in Late
Enrollees schools) would be misleading. To address this problem, we use an instru-
mental variable strategy. By assumption, here being in a Early Enrollees school is
only capturing the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect, because only some children in trea-
ted schools work with the assistant and are therefore actually treated. Instead, we
use the assignment of treatment (being in an Early Enrollee school) as an instrumen-
tal variable for treatment received (being helped by the assistant) to estimate the
effect of treatment on the treated.
YðiÞj ¼ h0 þ h1assistantj þ h2X0ðiÞj þ eðiÞj ð3Þ
where Y(i)j corresponds to the outcomes of interest of individual i in household j:
likelihood of ﬁnding a job with primary school as the highest level of education
attained, likelihood of ﬁnding a job with secondary school as the highest level of
39 The minimum monthly wage in Serbia in 2010 was almost 200 euros (21,645 dinars; 1 RSD = 0.009626
euros as of November 2011). The average wage was around 330 euros (34,422 dinars) and in Belgrade it was
around 400 euros, corresponding to 42,421 dinars (Serbian Statistical Ofﬁce, 2010).
40 If we consider only the oldest boy and the oldest girl in the household we obtain similar results. The magni-
tude of the coefﬁcients is even larger. The coefﬁcient of treatment for boys is statistically signiﬁcant at 10
percent.
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education attained, (log) mean amount of earnings per month with primary educa-
tion and (log) mean amount of earnings per month with secondary education and
secondary school as the highest expected level of education. assistantj is equal to 1
when there is at least one child in the household who is directly helped by the assis-
tant, and 0 otherwise. Given the problem of selection bias, we know that the error
term ɛ(i)j is composed here of two parts:
ðiÞj ¼ gðiÞj þ uðiÞj ð4Þ
where g(i)j is an unobservable individual term and u(i)j is a random term. assistantj
depends on some factors captured by g(i)j. We therefore model assistantj in a reduced
form framework as follows:
assistantj ¼ c0 þ c1treatmentj þ c2X0ðiÞj þ gðiÞj þ vðiÞj ð5Þ
where treatmentj is equal to 1 if there is at least one child in the household enrolled in
a Early Enrollees school. Being enrolled in a Early Enrollees school is correlated with
the fact of being helped by the assistant but uncorrelated with any unobservable
attributes that affect the outcomes of interest. The instrument is as good as randomly
assigned. It also satisﬁes the exclusion restriction by assumption: only parents of
children directly interacting with the assistant are aware of her presence in the
school. The instrument operates only through the fact of being helped by the assis-
tant (Yi(d, 0) = Yi(d, 1) for d = 0, 1). The monotonicity assumption needed for
heterogeneous IV models holds: while the instrument may have no effect on some
people, all those who are affected are affected in the same way. h1 in Equation (3)
captures the local average treatment effect (LATE), which in this case is the effect of
treatment on the treated. There are no always-takers in this case that is children who
would receive the treatment independently of the school that they attend. Children
who are helped by the assistant are only in treated schools (Early Enrollees schools).
The treated population consists only of compliers: children who are assigned to treat-
ment are also those who actually do receive the treatment.
Results for the probability of ﬁnding a job, expected earnings and highest
expected educational level are reported in Table 6.41 Columns (1) to (2) show the
estimates for boys, while columns (3) to (4) show the estimates for girls.
41 The use of IV to solve selection bias problems is illustrated in Table A4 in the Appendix. Columns (1) and
(2) report OLS results. These estimates are misleading because they compare pupils according to the actual
treatment received: those helped by the assistant vs. those not helped in the same Early Enrollees schools and
children in control schools. Columns (3) and (4) compare pupils according to whether they are potentially
treated: being in a Early Enrollees or Late Enrollees school. This is the intention-to-treat (ITT) effect. Since treat-
ment was as good as randomly assigned, ITT tells us the causal effect of being in a Early Enrollees school. It
builds in the fact that some pupils in treated schools are not treated. For this reason, it is smaller than the aver-
age casual effect on those actually treated. It clearly corresponds to our main speciﬁcation where we assume
instead that everyone in a Early Enrollees school is treated. Columns (5) and (6) measure the effect of treatment
on the treated. They do not consistently differ from OLS estimates because treatment and control groups are
not so different in observable characteristics. We know that there is a problem of selection bias because the
assistant chooses the pupils to work with. Still, her choice seems to be close to a random choice. The selection
bias in this case is negative: those who are helped by the assistant tend to be the worst students.
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Table 6. Helped by the assistant
All outcomes by education level and by gender
Boys Girls
Max. level of education Primary
school
Secondary
School
Primary
school
Secondary
school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of ﬁnding a job with primary/secondary school
Assistant 0.135 0.032 0.224 0.061
(0.149) (0.111) (0.152) (0.103)
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 276 276 268 267
R2 0.143 0.070 0.113 0.120
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
Assistant 0.285* 0.190* 0.284 0.194*
(0.165) (0.109) (0.189) (0.116)
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 119 224 98 216
R2 0.162 0.047 0.217 0.094
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
Assistant 0.260* 0.007
(0.136) (0.176)
Controlsb Yes Yes
No. observations 232 221
R2 0.340 0.231
First stage – Being helped by the assistant
Treatment 0.472*** 0.465***
(0.058) (0.073)
Controlsc Yes Yes
No. observations 232 221
R2 0.464 0.446
F-statistic on treatment 84.14 47.21
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 per-
cent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
aControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of
female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of adults.
bControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished primary
school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of female chil-
dren between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of adults, age of child,
age of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
cThe coefﬁcients are estimated both with the controls used with the ﬁrst two outcomes and with the third one. The
estimates reported are obtained by using the outcome ‘secondary school as the highest expected level of educa-
tion’. Therefore, here control variables include wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁn-
ished primary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number
of female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of adults,
age of child, age of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in
Serbian.
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The coefﬁcients for the expected probabilities of ﬁnding a job with the primary
and secondary school as the highest level of education are reported in the top panel.
They are similar to those obtained in the main speciﬁcation. As before, results are not
statistically signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations and, due to low power, we cannot claim
the programme to be ineffective on job opportunities. The second part of the table
shows the results for the expected (log) mean earnings per month. Parents in treated
households expect higher future wages for both boys and girls, as in the main speciﬁ-
cation. The impacts are reasonably higher: in this case, we are sure parents know the
assistant and their children are actually helped by her. Conditional on having attained
a secondary education level, being in a treated household increases the expected
monthly earnings by almost 21 percent for both boys and girls, on average.42 This
increase corresponds to roughly 55 euros. As before, for boys this is the case also con-
ditional on having attained a primary educational level: being in a treated household
increases the expected monthly earnings by almost 33 percent,43 on average, corre-
sponding to 89 euros. The regression results for secondary education as the highest
expected level of education are reported in the third part of the table. We ﬁnd that
parents whose children are helped by the assistant are more likely to expect their chil-
dren to ﬁnish secondary school. As in the main speciﬁcation, the impact is statistically
signiﬁcant only for boys. On average, parents of pupils in Early Enrollees schools are
26 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to ﬁnish secondary school.44 The
bottom part of Table 6 reports the results for the ﬁrst-stage. The coefﬁcients of being
in an Early Enrolless school are positive, as expected, and highly statistically signiﬁ-
cant. The ﬁrst-stage results for the instrumental variable estimation show that F-statis-
tics on the incidence of treatment are clearly above 10.45
4.2.1 Remedial education programme and role model
Knowing who is actually helped by the assistant allows us to better understand the
possible mechanisms behind the changes in expectations we observe. The effect of
the programme passes through the remedial education channel: parents expect their
children to go to school more because they now perform better thanks to the assis-
tant. Moreover, in the Roma Teaching Assistant programme all the assistants are
Roma and from the same social background as the pupils they help. In order to
obtain the job they needed to have invested in education in the ﬁrst place. They can
therefore act as role models for the children with whom they work. The presence of
a person sharing her successful story can affect children’s and their parents’ expecta-
tions about their future. Their accomplishment can shape parents’ and children’s
beliefs about what they can achieve and in turn can affect educational choices.
42 They correspond to 0.627 and 0.608 of a standard deviation, respectively.
43 It corresponds to 0.821 of a standard deviation.
44 It corresponds to 0.531 of a standard deviation.
45 F-statistics on the incidence of treatment are reported in the bottom line of Table 6. The Cragg–Donald
Wald F-test of weak instruments is equal to 116.297.
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We ﬁrst consider the remedial education channel. In our survey we ran quick
tests in the subjects of Mathematics and Serbian. We deﬁne Maths score equal to 1
when the child is able to correctly answer both questions – ‘Please tell me how much
is 5 + 4?’ and ‘Please tell me how much is 23 + 12?’ and 0 otherwise. We deﬁne Ser-
bian score as equal to 1 when the child is able to read and write. A child is able to
read when she knows how to correctly read the sentence written on a card ‘Could
you please read me the letters, the word and the sentence on this card?’; Able to read
takes the value of 0 when she does not know letters, recognizes only letters or is able
to read the words but cannot read the whole sentence. A child is able to write when
she knows how to correctly write a proposed sentence ‘Please write the following
sentence’; Able to write takes the value of 0 when she does not know how to write at
all or she writes the sentence with mistakes. These abilities are supposed to be
acquired in the ﬁrst year of primary school. Hence, we do expect children of any
grade to be able to answer them. Results for the LATE are reported in Table 7.
Pupils who are helped by the assistant perform better than their classmates and
pupils in Late Enrollees schools in both test scores, although the impacts are statisti-
cally signiﬁcant only for Serbian. On average, boys get 0.56 of a standard deviation
more; girls get 0.66 of a standard deviation more.46 Thanks to the assistant, treated
kids learn more and these impacts are large.
In order to disentangle the two possible mechanisms we have in mind – remedial
education and role model – we select only those pupils who did not answer the Ser-
bian and the Maths tests correctly.47 If among the worst performers we ﬁnd that
expectations have increased for those helped by the assistant, we have evidence that
the effect of the programme does not occur only through the remedial education
channel. They have been helped by the assistant but they are not learning more at
school. Still, the parents believe that their children’s returns to education will be
higher and that they will attain a secondary level of education. We are aware that
parents may misperceive their children abilities and overestimate them (Dizon-Ross,
2013). We are assuming that this happens in the same way for treated and untreated
households. If, however, we believe that misperception takes place differently
between the two types of households, it is likely that our estimates are underesti-
mating the effect. Parents with children helped by the assistant can be more
informed of their actual abilities and less likely to overestimate them than parents
who do not interact with the assistant. The results are reported in Table 8.
46 We also studied the impact of the programme on schooling outcomes in its ﬁrst year of implementation in
a companion study Battaglia and Lebedinski (2015). In that study, we found that the programme had a posi-
tive effect. There is evidence that children involved in the RTA programme attended school more regularly
and that, on average, marks improved and dropout rates reduced for children in their ﬁrst grade. Higher and
more systematic impacts are obtained in schools with a lower number of Roma, especially if female.
47 To check the robustness of our ﬁndings, we estimate the effects separately by selecting those who did not
answer the Serbian test correctly and those who did not answer the Maths test correctly. The results do not
change.
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The previous results are conﬁrmed, although caution should be taken in the inter-
pretation of the coefﬁcients given the even smaller sample size. The results suggest a
positive trend in expectations for the probability of ﬁnding a job, although they are
still not statistically signiﬁcant. Conditional on having attained a certain educational
level, being helped by the assistant may increase the expected monthly earnings,
although the results are not signiﬁcantly different from zero. Due to the limited power
of our study, we cannot interpret them as the programme was ineffective on these
outcomes. The coefﬁcients for the highest expected level of education are higher than
in the previous case when the whole sample is considered. On average, parents of
pupils directly interacting with the assistant are 39.2 percentage points more likely to
expect their sons to ﬁnish secondary school.48 Even if their children – who are helped
by the assistant – are not learning at school, parents still believe they will go to school
more and have higher returns to education, once the children have attained a sec-
ondary level of education. There is evidence that the programme changes parents’
expectations not only through the remedial education channel. The presence of a per-
son from the same social background sharing her successful story may affect parents’
expectations about their children’s future. Yet, the unfortunate absence of non-Roma
assistants does not allow us to state the effective relevance of the role model. In the
RTA programme, all the assistants are Roma and, given that there is no variation in
whether the assistant is Roma or not, it is hard to draw strong conclusions.
Table 7. Helped by the assistant
Test scores by gender
Maths score Serbian score Able to read Able to write
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Assistant 0.133 0.085 0.280* 0.304* 0.187 0.107 0.170 0.100
(0.149) (0.158) (0.154) (0.159) (0.147) (0.161) (0.138) (0.124)
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No.
observations
189 153 185 153 189 155 184 154
R2 0.210 0.186 0.172 0.046 0.136 0.106 0.228 0.131
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 per-
cent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
aControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of
female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of
adults, age of child, age of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and
demeaned mark in Serbian.
48 It corresponds to 0.927 of a standard deviation.
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4.3 Dropout rates at the end of primary school
It is not a foregone result that the effects we observe on parents’ expectations neces-
sarily translate to more years of schooling. Data on persistence in school can help us
to shed light on the actual effects of the RTA programme. Unfortunately, both types
Table 8. Helped by the assistant. Worst performers
All outcomes by education level and by gender
Boys Girls
Max. level of education Primary
school
Secondary
School
Primary
school
Secondary
school
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Probability of ﬁnding a job with primary/secondary school
Assistant 0.259 0.025 0.156 0.026
(0.177) (0.151) (0.215) (0.138)
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 151 151 145 145
R2 0.164 0.158 0.074 0.234
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
Assistant 0.580 0.146 0.321 0.084
(0.438) (0.160) (0.270) (0.155)
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. observations 77 121 60 118
R2 0.303 0.106 0.249 0.107
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
Assistant 0.392** 0.022
(0.180) (0.233)
Controlsb Yes Yes
No. observations 128 117
R2 0.372 0.269
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level in parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 per-
cent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
aControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of
female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of adults.
bControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of
female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of adults,
age of child, age of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in
Serbian.
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of schools – Early and Late Enrollees – are treated starting from 2010 and it is impossi-
ble to detect the long-term effects on dropout rates in the absence of a control group.
Using administrative data from the ﬁnal examination at the end of primary school
obtained from the Ministry of Education (Serbian Ministry of Education, 2016), we
can track the children of our survey from Early and Late Enrollees schools, observe
whether they ﬁnish primary school and provide descriptive statistics on the share of
pupils who ﬁnished primary school according to the number of years exposed to
the treatment. We can repeat the same exercise with children who were directly
helped by the assistant in Early Enrollees schools.49
Table 9 shows the share of pupils from our survey who ﬁnished primary school
according to the number of years of treatment, both for all pupils (columns (1) and
(2)) and for those pupils who were helped by the assistant (columns (3) and (4)). The
maximum number of years of treatment is seven because the programme was intro-
duced in the 2009/2010 school year and the available ﬁnal examination dataset ends
in September 2016. The minimum number of years of treatment is ﬁve because the
assistants worked primarily with the lower four grades and started to work in
2009/2010: in 2009/2010 the oldest treated pupils were in the fourth grade and they
ﬁnished primary school at the earliest in 2013/2014.
We can observe that, in both samples, the share of pupils ﬁnishing primary
school is higher if pupils were treated for seven years than if they were treated for
fewer years. Moreover, note also that the assistants worked mainly with low per-
forming students and even these students were as likely to ﬁnish primary school as
other students. We cannot claim there is a causality here: we cannot conclude that
the effects on parents’ expectations necessarily translated to more years of schooling.
Table 9. Share of pupils in our survey who ﬁnished primary school by number of
years of treatment
All pupils Early and Late
Enrollees
Pupils helped by the assistant
Early Enrollees
Percentage No. observations Percentage No. observations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Seven years of treatment 37.78 45 40.00 20
Six years of treatment 28.04 107 25.93 27
Five years of treatment 31.51 73 25.00 16
Source: Data from the ﬁnal examination at the end of primary school (Serbian Ministry of Education).
49 It is too early to get any information on secondary education: pupils involved in the programme have not
yet reached the age to ﬁnish secondary school. They were at most in the fourth grade in 2010 and therefore
they are in the ﬁrst grade of secondary education in 2016.
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Nonetheless, the information available suggests that more years of exposure to the
RTA programme are associated with a higher probability of at least ﬁnishing pri-
mary school. This is extremely relevant in a context where even primary completion
rates are usually low.
5. Conclusion
We exploit the gradual implementation of the RTA programme to identify its impact
on expectations. Our data, collected one year after the ﬁrst implementation, suggest
that parents of children involved in the programme expect higher returns to educa-
tion for their children. They may not be more likely to expect them to ﬁnd a job, but
once employed they are expected to earn higher wages. This suggests that they
might expect better jobs for them. On average, being in a treated household
increases the expected monthly earnings by almost 9.4 percent for boys and 10.07
percent for girls. Moreover, on average, parents of pupils in treated schools are 12.3
percentage points more likely to expect their sons to ﬁnish secondary education than
parents of pupils in control schools. However, there is only one assistant per school
and not every Roma child in the treated school is helped by her. One can argue that
only parents of children directly interacting with the assistant are the actual treated
group. Our second deﬁnition of treatment considers a household to be treated only
if at least one child is in a treated school and there is evidence from the survey that
the assistant has worked with her. We obtain results similar to the main speciﬁca-
tion. The impacts are reasonably higher, although the results are always weakly sta-
tistically signiﬁcant. The effect of the programme occurs through the remedial
education channel, especially for pupils we know are helped by the assistant. Par-
ents expect their children to go to school more because they now perform better
thanks to the assistant. From our survey, we know that those helped by the assistant
do better in test scores. However, if we select the students performing badly, we still
ﬁnd higher expected returns to education for pupils helped by the assistant. In addi-
tion to the remedial education mechanism, the presence of a person of the same
social background who is successful may motivate parents to believe their children
can succeed. We cannot conclude that the effects on parents’ expectations necessar-
ily translate to more years of schooling. Nonetheless, administrative data from the
ﬁnal examination at the end of primary school obtained from the Ministry of Educa-
tion suggests that more years of exposure to the RTA programme are associated
with a higher probability of at least ﬁnishing primary school.
The Roma Teaching Assistant programme raises the expectations of the targeted
minority. Roma people may reasonably underestimate the need to invest in educa-
tion: they often perceive low beneﬁts of going to school compared to the respective
costs and underinvest in education. The success of the remedial education mecha-
nism, together with the provision of a role model, can be effective in increasing
households’ current investment in education. Moreover, remedial education
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programmes that target minorities through the hiring of minority teachers can help
create role models by providing previously unexpected opportunities to a group.
The unfortunate absence of non-Roma assistants does not allow us to state the effec-
tive relevance of the role model. Yet, this study suggests replicable examples in con-
texts where minorities suffer low attainment rates and social exclusion. One year of
a remedial education programme may not be enough to break the curse of low
expectations, but encouraging results are found in this direction. Investigating the
effects of such programmes in the long-run is a central question for future research.
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Appendix A
A.1 School characteristics
Table A1. Characteristics of the schools and assistants (Belgrade) the year before the
introduction of the RTA program – 2008
All Early
Enrollees
Late
Enrollees
Difference
(1  2)
P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Characteristics of the schools
Class size 22.22 20.00 25.00 5.00 [0.147]
No. of Roma per class 4.67 3.60 6.00 2.40 [0.493]
No. of Roma per class
(if at least a Roma)
4.67 3.60 6.00 2.40 [0.493]
No. of Roma per school (%) 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.01 [0.968]
Female
Roma 0.48 0.52 0.45 0.07 [0.109]
Non-Roma 0.48 0.50 0.47 0.03 [0.289]
Born in the same town
Roma 0.77 0.79 0.76 0.03 [0.353]
Non-Roma 0.89 0.90 0.88 0.02 [0.278]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
Number of Roma pupils 567 238 329
Number of Non-Roma pupils 2,199 975 1,224
Notes:aEarly Enrollees schools are 6. One school did not provide us the list of students so it is excluded from
our sample.
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A.2 First deﬁnition: Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
Table A2. Marks, absences and dropouts in previous years
All Early Enrollees Late Enrollees Difference
(1  2)
P
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Year of the introduction of the RTA program – 2009
Marks in Mathematics 3.85 3.90 3.81 0.09 [0.495]
Marks in Serbian 3.99 4.05 3.95 0.10 [0.369]
Absences 58.49 60.02 57.34 2.68 [0.673]
Dropout 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 [0.577]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
No. observations 2,693 1,153 1,540
Previous year – 2008
Marks in Mathematics 3.80 3.82 3.78 0.45 [0.705]
Marks in Serbian 3.94 3.95 3.94 0.01 [0.956]
Absences 60.88 68.72 55.05 13.67 [0.143]
Dropout 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 [0.560]
Number of schools 9 5a 4
No. observations 2,638 1,123 1,515
Notes:aEarly Enrollees schools are 6. One school did not provide us the list of students so it is excluded from
our sample.
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A.3 Second deﬁnition: Directly helped vs. not directly helped by the
assistant in Early Enrollees schools
Table A3. Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
Pooled sample: all outcomes by education level
Max. level of education Primary school Secondary school
(1) (2)
Probability of ﬁnding a job with primary/secondary school
Treatment 0.112 0.046
(0.094) (0.111)
Treatment 9 male 0.037 0.050
(0.107) (0.114)
Controlsa Yes Yes
Total Effect 0.074 0.003
(0.111) (0.143)
No. observations 534 533
R2 0.135 0.095
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
Treatment 0.109 0.096
(0.107) (0.119)
Treatment 9 male 0.029 0.011
(0.123) (0.114)
Controlsa Yes Yes
Total effect 0.079 0.085
(0.525) (0.308)
No. observations 209 431
R2 0.223 0.139
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
Treatment 0.001
(0.111)
Treatment 9 male 0.123
(0.115)
Controlsb Yes
Total effect 0.122*
(0.074)
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A.4 Heterogeneous effects
A.4.1 Muslim households vs. Non-Muslim households
Our main speciﬁcation (1 and 2) is suggestive of the fact that there could be a differ-
ential effect of the programme on Muslim households: parents from Muslim house-
holds expect higher earnings conditional on ﬁnishing secondary school and they
expect their children to attain a lower level of education for both genders when com-
pared to non-Muslim households.50 Moreover, the descriptive statistics (see Table 2)
show that the treated and control groups differ in terms of the number of Muslim
households: there are signiﬁcantly more Muslim families among households with
children enrolled in Late Enrollees schools. We think it would be worthwhile investi-
gating whether the programme affects Muslims differently.
We proceed with the following speciﬁcation (A1) which includes the interaction
of being in a Muslim household and in a treated household:51
YðiÞj ¼ d0 þ d1treatmentj þ d2muslimj þ d3treatmentj muslimj þ d4X0ðiÞj þ j ðA1Þ
The outcomes, Y(i)j, are the same as in previous estimations. The coefﬁcient d1
captures the effect of treatment on non-Muslim households. The coefﬁcient d2 cap-
tures the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims among the Late Enrollees,
and d3 is the differential impact of interest. Our results are reported in Table A5.
Table A3. (Continued)
Max. level of education Primary school Secondary school
(1) (2)
No. observations 454
R2 0.286
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with Moulton conﬁdence intervals in
parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
aControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of
female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of
adults.
bControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of
female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of
adults, age of child, age of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and
demeaned mark in Serbian.
50 Results are not reported because we decided not to show the coefﬁcients of control variables in any speciﬁ-
cation, but they are available upon request.
51 In this speciﬁcation X(i)j does not include if the household is Muslim.
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The estimates reported in Table A5 suggest that the programme does not impact
Muslims and non-Muslims differently in terms of job market prospects and
expected wages. Nonetheless, non-Muslim households who attend Early Enrollees
schools are, on average, 21.4 percentage points more likely to expect their sons to
ﬁnish secondary education compared to non-Muslim households in control schools.
We do not know the religion of the assistants in order to investigate further.
Table A4. Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
OLS and IV estimates: all outcomes by gender
Gender OLS ITT IV
Boys Girls Boys Girls Boys Girls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of ﬁnding a job with primary/secondary school
Primary school 0.129* 0.135* 0.069 0.116 0.135 0.224
(0.076) (0.081) (0.078) (0.065) (0.149) (0.152)
Secondary school 0.003 0.031 0.016 0.032 0.032 0.061
(0.084) (0.076) (0.065) (0.055) (0.111) (0.103)
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Expected log earnings with primary/secondary school
Primary school 0.097 0.148 0.108* 0.123* 0.285* 0.284
(0.100) (0.095) (0.072) (0.071) (0.165) (0.189)
Secondary school 0.005 0.041 0.090* 0.096* 0.190* 0.194*
(0.057) (0.059) (0.048) (0.055) (0.109) (0.116)
Controlsa Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
Secondary school 0.152* 0.138 0.120* 0.003 0.260* 0.007
(0.082) (0.148) (0.069) (0.172) (0.136) (0.176)
Controlsb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with Moulton conﬁdence intervals in
parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent. The maximum
number of observations with primary school is 276 for boys and 268 for girls; with secondary school is 276 for
boys and 267 for girls.
aControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of female children
between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of adults.
bControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5 years, number of
female children between 6 and 15 years, number of male children between 6 and 15 years and number of
adults, age of child, age of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and
demeaned mark in Serbian.
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Table A5. Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
Heterogeneous effects: all outcomes for secondary school by gender
Boys Girls
Max. level of education Secondary school
(1) (2)
Probability of ﬁnding a job with secondary school
Treatment 0.026 0.038
(0.111) (0.097)
Muslim 0.010 0.020
(0.091) (0.085)
Treatment 9 muslim 0.064 0.009
(0.134) (0.118)
Controlsa Yes Yes
No. observations 279 270
R2 0.144 0.135
Expected log earnings with secondary school
Treatment 0.009 0.007
(0.082) (0.095)
Muslim 0.077 0.067
(0.069) (0.081)
Treatment 9 muslim 0.125 0.157
(0.100) (0.113)
Controlsa Yes Yes
No. observations 226 218
R2 0.131 0.158
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
Treatment 0.214** 0.175
(0.116) (0.311)
Muslim 0.131 0.097
(0.100) (0.239)
Treatment 9 muslim 0.149 0.244
(0.145) (0.336)
Controlsb Yes Yes
No. observations 233 221
R2 0.350 0.236
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with Moulton conﬁdence intervals in
parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
aControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults.
bControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), number of children under 5, number of female children
between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age of child
squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
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A.4.2 Young vs. old kids
Parents of younger children aged 6–10 years may respond differently to the pro-
gramme than parents of older children aged 11–15 years. There are two reasons to
expect this to be the case. First, assistants were explicitly asked to work more with
younger children. Second, we know that the gap in knowledge between Roma and
non-Roma pupils is already present when children enroll in primary school and that
it increases over time. Under such circumstances, it might be easier to inﬂuence par-
ents’ expectations for younger children than for the older ones.
We estimate the following regression by gender. We have individual outcomes
only for the expected educational level and we only estimate this outcome.
Yij ¼ #0 þ #1treatmentj þ #2youngij þ #3treatmentj  youngij þ #4X0ij þ sij ðA2Þ
where young is equal to 1 if the child is aged 6–10 years and equal to 0 if she is aged
11–15 years. The
results are shown in Table A6.
Our coefﬁcients are not statistically signiﬁcant when we compare boys in Early
Enrollees and Late Enrollees schools, although the magnitude and direction are still
suggestive of the effect. We ﬁnd that there is little difference between younger and
Table A6. Early Enrollees vs. Late Enrollees
Heterogeneous effects by gender (Young vs. Old)
Boys Girls
(1) (2)
Secondary school as the highest expected level of education
Treatment 0.091 0.159
(0.102) (0.166)
Young 0.071 0.378**
(0.106) (0.157)
Treatment 9 young 0.055 0.279*
(0.137) (0.167)
Controlsa Yes Yes
No. observations 233 221
R2 0.348 0.264
Notes: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level with Moulton conﬁdence intervals in
parentheses: *signiﬁcant at 10 percent, **signiﬁcant at 5 percent, ***signiﬁcant at 1 percent.
aControl variables included are wealth, informal (=1), urban (=1), only Roma in neighbourhood, ﬁnished pri-
mary school (=1), ﬁnished secondary school (=1), muslim (=1), number of children under 5, number of female
children between 6 and 15, number of male children between 6 and 15 and number of adults, age of child, age
of child squared, rank among siblings, demeaned mark in Mathematics and demeaned mark in Serbian.
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older boys. The programme affects the probability to ﬁnish secondary school simi-
larly for both groups, although the effect is slightly higher for younger children. We
ﬁnd a different effect for girls. Young girls in Early Enrollees schools are on average
27.9 percentage points more likely to be expected to ﬁnish secondary school than
older female schoolmates.
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